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    *The Honorable Jan E. Dubois, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  03-4740
JOSEPH NELSON,
               Appellant
   v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
___________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
(D.C. No.: C.A. No. 02-1642)
____________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1
June 16, 2004
Before: ALITO and SMITH, Circuit Judges,
and DUBOIS, District Judge*
(Filed: June 28, 2004 )
_________________
OPINION
_________________
    1The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We exercise
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Nelson contends that the District Court erred by affirming the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security which denied his claim for benefits under Title II
and Title XVI of the Social Security Act.1  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1383.  Our review “is
identical to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427
(3d Cir. 1999).  Substantial evidence is  “more than a mere scintilla.  It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
The regulations promulgated by the Social Security Administration establish a
five-step sequential analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled.  See 20
C.F.R. §§  404.1520, 416.920.   Nelson claims he is disabled due to limitations resulting
from a cervical laminectomy and spinal fusion.  He contends that the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred at step three of the analysis by finding that he did not have any of the
impairments that are listed in Appendix 1 to the regulations which would have
automatically entitled him to benefits.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1 (hereinafter cited as “Appendix 1").  In addition,
Nelson asserts that the ALJ erred at step five in determining that he was able to perform
3the full range of sedentary work, and therefore was not disabled.  
A Social Security claimant is deemed disabled and eligible for benefits if he
establishes at step three of the sequential analysis that his severe impairment satisfies the
criteria for an impairment listed in Appendix 1.   20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 
Nelson argues that the ALJ erred at this step because his conclusory statement that
Nelson’s impairment did not meet or equal a listing failed to provide the reasoned
explanation required by our decision in Burnett v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d Cir.
2000).  There, we instructed that the reasoned explanation is necessary for meaningful
judicial review.  Id. at 119.  
We have no difficulty conducting a meaningful review in this matter and find it
telling that Nelson failed to identify any listing he allegedly satisfied.  It is readily
apparent from a review of the ALJ’s decision that the ALJ determined that Nelson had a
severe impairment at step two of  the analysis because of the limitations resulting from his
back surgery and that those limitations were the basis of Nelson’s claim of disability.  The
only listing applicable to a back impairment was § 1.05, relating to Disorders of the
Spine.  Appendix 1, § 1.05.  The criteria required to satisfy listing § 1.05, however, were
not present in this record.  The ALJ noted as much in his decision, explaining that the
medical evidence, particularly a recent consultative examination by an orthopedic
physician, was unremarkable.  Indeed, Dr. Mylod, a medical expert who testified for
Nelson at the ALJ hearing, conceded that he could not opine as to whether Nelson met or
4equaled any listing because he did not have a detailed physical examination on which to
base his opinion.
With regard to step five in the analysis, Nelson asserts that the ALJ erred by
finding that he was able to perform the full range of sedentary work.  According to
Nelson, the ALJ erred because he failed to fully explain why he found Nelson capable of
sedentary work and because he failed to fully credit Nelson’s testimony.  Neither of these
arguments is persuasive.
In determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity, “the ALJ must consider
all evidence before him.  Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, he
must give some indication of the evidence which he rejects and his reason(s) for
discounting such evidence.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted).  Here, the ALJ
satisfied this standard.  The ALJ reviewed the scant medical evidence of record,
acknowledging that Nelson had undergone back surgery on two occasions and that
claimant’s treating physician had opined that in 1996 Nelson “was able to sit, stand, walk,
do limited lifting, limited carrying,” and to “handle objects, hear, speak and travel.” 
Additionally, the ALJ noted that the consultative examinations performed in 1998 and
1999 were unremarkable, revealing no significant findings.  Because this medical
evidence was not only uncontradicted, but also consistent with the residual functional
capacity for sedentary work, we find no error by the ALJ.
Nelson, however, contends that he was unable to perform sedentary work and that
5the ALJ erred because he failed to fully credit his testimony regarding his subjective
complaints.  We disagree.  By limiting Nelson to sedentary work, the ALJ accorded part
of Nelson’s testimony great weight.  The ALJ explained at length the reasons for 
discounting Nelson’s testimony that he was totally disabled and precluded from
performing even sedentary work, emphasizing the fact that Nelson’s claim that he was
severely limited was inconsistent with his decision to forego treatment for his disabling 
condition for several years.
In sum, we conclude that the Commissioner’s decision denying Nelson’s claim for
benefits is supported by substantial evidence.  We will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
